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Abstract: We examine differences in the value of statistical life (VSL) across potential wage 
levels in panel data using quantile regressions with intercept heterogeneity. Latent heterogeneity 
is econometrically important and affects the estimated VSL. Our findings indicate that a 
reasonable average cost per expected life saved cut-off for health and safety regulations is $7 
million to $8 million per life saved, but the VSL varies considerably across the labor force. Our 
results reconcile the previous discrepancies between hedonic VSL estimates and the values 
implied by theories linked to the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Because the VSL varies 
elastically with income, regulatory agencies should regularly update the VSL used in benefit 
assessments, increasing the VSL proportionally with changes in income over time.  
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The underlying economic benefits principle for policy assessments is that the benefit 
value is society’s willingness to pay for the benefit. The standard process of calculating the 
benefits of policies that reduce fatality risks involves multiplying the average risk reduction for 
the affected population by an average willingness to pay for the risk reduction based on the value 
of statistical life (VSL) revealed in labor market decisions.1 Whether the VSL from the labor 
market appropriately transfers as a benefits measure to other contexts depends on whether the 
population whose risks are being reduced has preferences for risk reduction that are similar to 
those in the labor market studies being used as the reference point.2 There are many sources of 
heterogeneity, including those stemming from age and other demographic factors. Our research 
presented here examines the economic and policy importance of heterogeneity in VSL based on 
income and the closely related matter of the person’s risk-taking behavior.  
 To elaborate, we examine the VSL distribution across the population using quantile 
regression estimates from panel data on workers’ wages. Our approach yields estimates of the 
VSL for different segments of the wage distribution, which are associated with different fatality 
risk levels and income levels. Because safety is a normal good, workers with higher income 
levels will have higher VSL levels and will tend to choose jobs with lower risk levels. Our 
empirical research explores the heterogeneity of VSL across different segments of the wage 
distribution and the associated income levels of people in the segments to infer the income 
elasticity of VSL. We consequently provide evidence on the relationship of VSL to income 
levels and to fatality risk levels, each of which have been matters of policy concern. 
                                                          
1 The benefit assessment procedure is consistent with that summarized by the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget (2003), OMB Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis. Although altruistic concerns may be relevant, typically the 
focus is on the willingness to pay by those whose risk level has been reduced by the policy. 
2 There may also be differences in the kinds of deaths involved and the associated morbidity effects, which may 
affect valuations as well (Viscusi 2009). 
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The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has long been concerned with the 
relationship of the VSL to the risk taking activities of the agency’s target populations. Officials 
at EPA often express doubts as to whether VSL estimates for workers who have self selected into 
risky jobs are pertinent to the protected population for involuntary environmental risks. The 
voluntary/involuntary risk distinction has also been included in proposed Federal legislation as a 
factor that should influence the selection of the VSL.3 Although there have been many pleas for 
using higher VSL amounts for involuntary risks, we know of no policymakers who have 
advocated using lower VSL amounts for people who have chosen to incur large risks, such as 
cigarette smokers or workers in extremely hazardous jobs. There is a clear asymmetry in the 
willingness of policymakers to draw distinctions, as increases in the VSL for involuntary risks 
are viewed with favor, but decreases in VSL are not advocated for people who face large risks 
voluntarily.4 
The counterpart of the risk-VSL relationship is the risk-income relationship. The U.S. 
Department of Transportation (DOT) provides for consideration of income in setting the VSL for 
benefit assessment, as it permits the use of an income elasticity adjustment of 0.55 based on the 
meta analysis of Viscusi and Aldy (2003).5 Agencies within DOT, notably the Federal Aviation 
Administration, have long maintained that the higher income levels of those protected by their 
regulations imply that a higher VSL level should be used for their regulations than for 
transportation policies generally.6 Senate Bill S. 3564 also recognizes the role of income 
                                                          
3 The distinction arises in Section 4A of the bill S. 3564 introduced by Senator Barbara Boxer in 2008, 110th 
Congress, 2d Session, the “Restoring the Value of Every American in Environmental Decisions Act.”   
4 Such asymmetries in valuation are similar to a wide variety of behavioral anomalies, such as loss aversion in 
prospect theory and a variety of models of reference dependence. 
5 U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Transportation Policy, Revised 
Departmental Guidance: Treatment of the Value of Preventing Fatalities and Injuries in Preparing Economic 
Analyses, August 2, 2005. 
6 Graham (2008) suggests that when policies have clearly different target groups, such as air travel versus bus travel, 
then income elasticities might be taken into account. Similarly, the Federal Aviation Administration sought to use a 
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adjustments, stating that the VSL amount must be increased annually to reflect changes in 
income.7 The proposed legislation does not permit decreasing VSL if income levels decline, 
which incomes did during the recession that began shortly after the legislation was proposed in 
2008. Our estimates will indicate whether an income-based adjustment to VSL is warranted and 
to what extent. 
Because in a quantile wage regression the VSLs vary with the potential wage ( ŵ ), it 
admits the possibility that VSL varies positively with income levels and permits the calculation 
of income elasticities for the different quantile groups. When income elasticities of VSL differ 
by income levels, it opens the door for Ramsey pricing of safety programs similar to that used for 
other health-related programs such as hospital pricing, where the decision is health with 
distributional consequences (Harris 1977).  
Estimates of the income elasticity are also useful in exploring whether the model 
underlying the hedonic equilibrium equation yields results consistent with economic theory. 
Kaplow (2005), among others, has noted the connection between risk aversion and VSL and has 
emphasized that VSL must be income elastic for the empirical results to be consistent with 
estimates based on the estimated coefficient of relative risk aversion in the consumption 
literature. Based on existing estimates in the literature, there is currently a disconnect between 
the theory and empirical evidence. The VSL has an estimated income elasticity less than 1.0, 
whereas risk aversion estimates would imply a VSL that is income elastic (Kniesner and Ziliak 
2002; Viscusi and Aldy 2003; Aldy and Viscusi 2008). Our income elasticity estimates establish 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
higher value of life than for other transportation policies because of the higher income of air travelers. See Viscusi 
(1993), which is based on his report to the FAA.  Based on this report, the agency sought to justifying using a higher 
VSL in its policy analyses. 
7 More specifically, VSL must be increased at least once a year to reflect “the average annual total compensation of 
individuals, including income and benefits.” 
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the consistency between the risk preferences in theoretical models and in the VSL literature that 
has eluded economists up till now. 
The relationship between VSL and income has also been a prominent component of 
broader commentaries on benefit-cost analysis that have challenged the willingness-to-pay 
principle for benefit assessment. According to the critiques, VSL amounts should be adjusted for 
people’s ability to pay and should not be limited by a person’s current resources. Given the 
positive income elasticity of VSL, such a proposal without an upper bound on the reference 
income amount is not well-defined. The ability to pay approach also is inconsistent with basing 
policies on the actual preferences of those being protected.  
 Our examination of the variation of the VSL with wage levels also has implications for 
the relation of VSL to risk levels. Consider a standard hedonic wage model. For any given firm, 
the offer curve of wages for different levels of risk will be governed by the requirements that 
workers be paid their marginal product and profits equal zero. Because safety is costly to 
provide, and increasingly so as the level of safety is increased, the wage offer curve ( )w   for the 
firm as a function of the risk level π will satisfy / 0dw d   and 2 2/ 0d w d  . The market 
offer curve ( )W   is the outer envelope of the individual firms’ offer curves and is generally 
assumed to have similar shape with / 0dW d   and 2 2/ 0d W d  .8 Workers choose various 
points along the market offer curve, with the local rate of tradeoff simultaneously reflecting the 
wage-risk tradeoff along the worker’s constant expected utility locus and the wage-risk tradeoff 
on the firm’s iso-profit curve.  
The hedonic labor market equation W ( ) estimates the locus of such choices. If all 
workers chose the same job, individual preferences would be determining the market tradeoff 
                                                          
8 Should there be any downward dip in the market offer curve, no worker would ever choose such a job that is 
dominated by available jobs offering higher wage for lower risk.  
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rate rather than the curvature of the market opportunities locus. But with people sorted along 
different points of the opportunities locus, the shape of the opportunities will be influential. Four 
empirical studies have examined the curvature of the market equilibrium wage-risk tradeoffs.9 
Each of the studies found that a worker’s wages are positively related to the level of risk, but at a 
diminishing rate. Thus, the VSL varies with the level of risk and declines as the risk level 
increases, as workers most willing to bear risk sort themselves into the riskiest pursuits. The 
VSL-risk relationship is also consistent with the hypothesized theoretical shape of the market 
opportunities locus. Our quantile regression analysis estimates the VSL levels at different 
junctures of the wage offer curve, generating information on the relationship of VSL to the 
fatality risk and worker income levels. 
Section 1 outlines our econometric approach. The estimation procedure for our panel data 
uses a new extension of the quantile regression method that recognizes the role of latent person-
specific heterogeneity, which Kniesner et al. (2008) have found to be critical in VSL studies. For 
the estimation, we construct a data set consisting of five waves of worker data from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics to which we match highly refined fatality risk data using the Census 
of Fatal Occupational Injuries. The empirical estimates in Section 3 indicate substantial variation 
in the VSL estimates across the quantile ranges, with a median value of about $7.5 million. In 
addition to providing VSL estimates at different levels of fatality risk and wage rates, our 
findings have fundamental policy ramifications as well. Section 3 uses the findings to show how 
a social welfare function based on willingness to pay will be more protective from a safety 
standpoint than the implications of a social welfare function in which all individuals’ risk 
reductions receive the same weight. In Section 4 we show that the VSL is highly elastic with 
                                                          
9 The studies, which are reviewed in Viscusi and Aldy (2003), are Viscusi (1981), Olson (1981), Dorsey and Walzer 
(1983), and Leigh and Folsom (1984). 
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respect to income. Our income-elastic VSL result using within sample estimates of the elasticity 
of the VSL with respect to family income is more in line with theoretical models, such as that of 
Kaplow (2005), than previous estimates based on comparisons across hedonic wage studies.  
Section 5 places our results in the context of the VSL literature. 
1. Econometric Framework 
In a previous paper we established that individual heterogeneity in the form of a latent 
time invariant intercept was crucially important to estimating VSL in a linear panel data 
regression model, much more so than endogeneity of fatal injury risk (Kniesner et al. 2008). It 
was also the case that how one controlled for heterogeneity (fixed effects versus a mis-specified 
exogenous random effects model) was far less important to the estimates than whether one 
controls for differential intercepts at all. 
In continuing our exploration of the heterogeneity of regression parameters, we examine 
slope differences using the concept of quantile regression. It is only recently that estimators have 
appeared for quantile regression in a panel context that also permit latent person-specific 
heterogeneity (Koenker 2004; Lamarche 2006). Interquartile differences in estimated fatality risk 
marginal effects and the associated VSLs capture distributional issues such as asymmetry not 
evident in mean regression. Even a simple comparison of the mean versus median VSL is 
instructive for safety policy where the VSL is a benefit comparison point for evaluating life-
saving programs with different cost levels. In particular, using the median program benefit as a 
cutoff value ensures that a majority of the affected population will benefit from the program, 
which need not be the case using the mean of an asymmetric benefit distribution as a cost-
effectiveness cutoff. 
To fix notation let our regression model be  
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ln it it i itw x u    ,        (1) 
where i indexes the worker, t indexes time, and the vector of covariates includes fatal injury risk 
(π) and the usual demographic characteristics of the worker (z). The αi’s are the time-invariant 
worker-specific effects, and uit is the usual random error term. In (1) there are common marginal 
effects. 
1.1 Quantile Regression Approach 
In a quantile regression model one has ( )j   where j indexes the quantiles of the 
potential regression outcomes. For tractability, when T is finite the researcher usually begins by 
assuming that the worker-specific effect, αi, is a so-called pure location shift that applies (is 
common) to all the conditional quantiles of the regression outcomes. In our estimation we follow 
the innovative regression model developed in Lamarche (2006). He begins by noting that a 
shrinkage estimator wherein a tuning parameter (call it ) controls the degree of inter-person 
intercept differences is a way to limit the variability of the multiplicity of marginal effect 
estimates in a quantile regression. The tuning parameter ranges across the spectrum of complete 
to no heterogeneity and can either be estimated or fixed ex ante. The idea is the optimal 
shrinkage of the differentials toward a common intercept. We minimize the trace of the 
covariance matrix when estimating the tuning parameter as well as provide estimates of several 
extreme cases, such as complete versus no intercept heterogeneity. 
Lamarche’s (2006) estimator finds the  
1 1 1 1
arg min( , ) (ln ( ) )
j j
J T N N
it it j i i
j t i i
w x         
   





  is the relative weight of the jth quantile and ( ) ( ( 0))
j j
u u I u     is the quantile 
loss function. 
Here the tuning parameter ( 2 2/u    ) regulates the influence on the quantiles of the 
estimated worker effects. In the case where  = 0 the fixed effects estimator emerges while for 
the case where  > 0 a penalized (shrinkage) estimator with fixed effects appears (Lamarche 
2006). As noted, we explore two ways of valuing  , fixing it ex ante, as the estimator ˆ( , )   is 
asymptotically unbiased for all  > 0, and finding its trace minimizing estimated value, which is 
a form of feasible generalized least squares (GLS) analogous to penalized least squares for panel 
data (Lamarche 2006). Finally, the pattern of ˆ( )j   describes how the resulting marginal impact 
of fatality risk varies across potential wage outcomes.  
We also use our estimates of 1
ˆ ( )j   to construct estimates of the value of a statistical life 
and note how the associated VSLs vary across potential wage outcomes. Accounting for the fact 
that fatality risk is per 100,000 workers and that the typical work-year is about 2,000 hours, the 
estimated value of a statistical life for a quantile of the potential wage distribution is   
 
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( )) 2000 100,000j j j j
w
VSL w    

 
      
.   (3) 
To summarize, equations (1) and (3) describe our organizing framework: (1) is the 
hedonic market wage locus and (3) is the associated value of statistical life (VSL), which 
depends on the estimated parameters of (1) via the marginal effect of fatal injury risk (π) and is 
non-constant in the context of a quantile regression estimator (2). There are two kinds of 
heterogeneity that come into play. One is econometric heterogeneity whereby the wage equation 
intercepts vary with the person indicator (i). The other is economic heterogeneity whereby there 
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is curvature of the hedonic locus ( ̂ varies with  ) to reflect both latent worker and firm 
differences in risk tolerance and cost functions. 
1.2 PSID Data 
 The main body of our data comes from the 1993–2001 waves of the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), which provides individual-level data on wages, industry and 
occupation, and demographics. The PSID survey has followed a core set of households since 
1968 plus newly formed households as members of the original core have split off into new 
families. 
The sample we use consists of male heads of household ages 18–65 who are in the 
random Survey Research Center (SRC) portion of the PSID, and thus excludes the oversample of 
the poor in the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) and the Latino sub-sample. The male 
heads in our regressions (i) worked for hourly or salary pay at some point in the previous 
calendar year, (ii) were not permanently disabled or institutionalized, (iii) were not in agriculture 
or the armed forces, (iv) had a real hourly wage greater than $2 per hour and less than $100 per 
hour, and (v) had no missing data on wages, education, region, industry, and occupation. All real 
wages and VSL estimates are in terms of 2001 dollars based on the personal consumption 
expenditure deflator. 
Beginning in 1997 the PSID moved to every-other-year interviewing. For consistent 
spacing of survey response we use data from the 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 waves. The 
use of every-other-year responses will be one of many mechanisms to reduce the influence of 
measurement error in our estimated VSL. We do not require individuals to be present for the 
entire sample period; we have an unbalanced panel where we take missing values as random 
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events.10 Our sample filters yielded 2,036 men and 6,625 person-years. About 40 percent of the 
men were present for all five waves (nine years); another 25 percent were present for at least four 
waves. 
 The demographic controls in the model include years of formal education, a quadratic in 
age, dummy variables for state of residence, dummy indicators for region of country, race, union 
status, marital status, and one-digit occupation. 
1.3 Fatality Risk Data 
 We used the fatality rate for the worker’s two-digit industry by one-digit occupation 
group. We distinguished 720 industry-occupation groups using a breakdown of 72 two-digit SIC 
code industries and the 10 one-digit occupational groups. After constructing codes for two-digit 
industry by one-digit occupation in the PSID we then matched each worker to the relevant 
industry-occupation fatality risk. Our worker fatality risk variable uses proprietary U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics data from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) for 1992–2002.11 
 The CFOI provides the most comprehensive inventory to date of all work-related 
fatalities in a given year. The CFOI data come from reports by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration, workers’ compensation reports, death certificates, and medical examiner 
reports. To be classified as a work-related injury the decedent must have been employed at the 
time of the fatal event and engaged in legal work activity that required the worker be present at 
the site of the fatal incident. In each case the BLS verified the work status of the decedent with 
two or more of the above source documents or with a follow-up questionnaire in conjunction 
with a source document.  
                                                          
10 Ziliak and Kniesner (1998) showed that when there is non-random attrition fixed effects models should remove it 
along with the other time-invariant factors. 
11 Restricted access to CFOI fatality data was obtained via an agreement with the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Our variable construction procedure follows that in Viscusi (2004), which describes the properties of the 720 
industry-occupation breakdown in greater detail.  
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 Because our fatality risk variable is by industry and by occupation, it provided a much 
more pertinent measure of the risk associated with a particular job than a more broadly based 
index, such as the industry risk alone, which is the most widely used job risk variable. Taking 
into account the occupation as well as the industry as we did here substantially reduces the 
measurement error in the fatality risk variable. 
The importance of the industry-occupation structure of our risk variable is especially 
great within the context of a panel data analysis. By using a fatality risk variable that varies over 
time and is defined for 720 industry-occupation groups, we greatly expanded the observed 
variance in workers’ job risks across different periods.  
Our focal measure of the fatal injury risk rate used the number of fatalities in each 
industry-occupation cell. The denominator is the number of employees for that industry-
occupation group in survey year t. Our measure of the fatality risk is time-varying because of 
changes in both the numerator and the denominator.12 
We expect less reporting error in the industry information than in the occupation 
information, so our annual measure should have less measurement error than if the worker’s 
occupation were the basis for matching (Mellow and Sider 1983; Black and Kniesner 2003). To 
reduce the influence of large swings in fatality risk further, we dropped person-years where the 
percentage change in fatality risk exceeded a positive 300 percent or negative 75 percent. The 
sample mean fatality risk for the annual measure is 6.4/100,000. 
2. Quantile Hedonic Wage Equation Estimates: Marginal Effects and VSL 
Table 1 presents quantile regression estimates of the fatal injury risk for no latent 
heterogeneity and varying degrees of possible heterogeneity ex ante as reflected in the specified 
                                                          
12 We used the bi-annual employment averages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, 
unpublished table, Table 6, Employed Persons by Detailed Industry and Occupation for 1993–2001.  
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value of . The regression for  = 1 minimized the trace of the variance-covariance matrix. Note 
that the most curvature of the hedonic wage function (the biggest inter-quantile differences in the 
estimated marginal effect) appears in the regression without latent heterogeneity and that the 
least curvature appears when the most heterogeneity is specified ex ante. We rely on the 
estimated marginal effects from the regression selected by the econometric model, which is 
where ˆ 1  , and ˆ ˆ( 0.90) / ( 0.10) 1.5      . 
Figures 1 and 2 present two different calculations of VSL. Figure 1 uses the quantiles’ 
actual wage rate averages so that the VSL computation using (3) reflects inter-quantile 
differences in both marginal effects and potential wages. Figure 2 standardizes the VSL by the 
median wage rate. Again focusing on the VSLs for the regression with the heterogeneity weight 
selected by the econometric model ( 1.0  ), the ( 0.90) / ( 0.10) 5VSL VSL     when both 
sources of variation are included versus ( 0.90) / ( 0.10) 1.5VSL VSL     based on differences 
in marginal effects alone. The effect of the wage in the calculation is much more important than 
the effect of the differences in estimated marginal effects of fatal injury risk. Of course, in both 
cases the median VSL is about $7 million to $8 million and is a possible cutoff for regulatory 
policy decisions in that regulations costing no more than this benefit at least half the affected 
population.  
The essence of our quantile regression approach is that the estimated marginal effects 
differ by potential wage (and therefore income) so that there is (more) nonlinear curvature 
potential. The policy relevance of our results includes how they may pertain to updating of the 
VSL for income growth when used in regulatory agency decisions. The implication of how the 
curvature is reduced when controlling for individual intercepts is analogous to the issue of 
poolability in linear panel models. As is well-known, if there is a positive marginal effect of a 
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covariate and intercepts vary positively with the covariate, then an equation that pools the data 
and forces a common intercept will estimate a steeper regression line than the flatter (set of) true 
regression lines that have intercept heterogeneity. Analogously, we found that the curvature is 
reduced dramatically (the marginal effect of fatality is more constant across quantiles) when we 
allowed for intercept heterogeneity. As in the case of the linear panel models we have estimated 
in earlier papers, the researcher needs to allow for intercept heterogeneity in panel quantile 
models of hedonic wage equilibrium with fatal injury risk. 
There is yet another dimension of the curvature we found in the estimated marginal 
effects and the associated VSL. Recently, Chetty (2009) fleshed out the concept of a sufficient 
statistic for policy analysis. The idea is that a deep structural parameter, while generally desirable 
for policy evaluation, may be econometrically difficult to obtain because of endogeneity of the 
constraint set and the implausibility of instruments coupled with the inability or unwillingness to 
wait for nature or the NSF to produce a suitable experiment or random controlled trial. An 
alternative research approach is to use economic theory to locate reduced form parameters that 
are sufficient to infer welfare effect levels and directions, so-called sufficient statistics. 
Here the sufficient-statistic issue relates to the curvature of the hedonic locus. 
Theoretically, the hedonic wage equation that we estimate is the locus of tangencies of workers’ 
indifference curves and firms’ iso-profit curves or the set of market equilibrium outcomes, and, 
as such, need be upward sloping as both sets of curves slope upward but can have any shape 
depending on the degree of heterogeneity of firms versus workers. We found not only the needed 
upward slope, but also a slope that declines with the potential wage so that the hedonic locus we 
estimated reflects not only the indifference curve shape but also the heterogeneity of preferences 
across workers at different income levels. This is sufficient to infer that differences in the 
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aversion to a work-related death by workers dominate cost structure differences of firms. The 
result is also sufficient to conclude that the compensation a worker needs to accept a non-
infinitesimal additional risk is at least as great as the amount indicated by the slope of the 
hedonic locus (the locus would be an upper bound if inter-firm heterogeneity were instead 
dominant). Thus, the heterogeneity that we find in the marginal effects via quantile regression is 
a sufficient statistic, so to speak, for using the set of estimated VSL numbers in Figures 1 and 2 
as thresholds for regulatory costs of a life-saving regulation. On average, or at any potential 
wage quantile, our results imply cost-effectiveness of a regulation that is less costly. 
3. Social Welfare Implications of Heterogeneity in Our VSL Estimates  
As we have noted, the standard benefits measure in benefit-cost analyses is the average 
societal willingness to pay for the benefit. The theoretical foundation for the benefit calculation 
is based on a social welfare function v that is additive in the utilities of the individuals in the 
citizenry. In addition, whatever distributional weights are applied are constructed so that the 
marginal social benefit of increasing the wealth (yi) of person i is equalized across the 
population, or that  v/ yi is the same for all i. Thus, the benefit value is the sum of the different 
individuals’ willingness to pay for the benefit, where each person’s willingness to pay amount is 
accorded the same weight. 
In the case of reduced mortality risks, consider the benefit associated with small 
reductions in mortality risk that will eliminate m expected deaths for population n, where the 
fatality risk probability (π) being reduced is m/n. Let VSLi be the value of statistical life for 
person i. Then the value of the benefit is 
 
1 1




VSL m n m n VSL mVSL
 




iVSL  denotes the mean VSL for the population. The mean VSL across the population 
multiplied by the expected number of deaths that will be prevented yields the benefit amount. 
Recent theoretical research by Manski (2009) implies that the arithmetic mean VSL 
would be the cutoff for program economic efficacy, even if VSL is heterogeneous across people. 
The argument is that the government should buy the identical amount of safety for everyone, 
which is the average amount that individuals would demand because a common amount is 
welfare maximizing in a probabilistic setting, much like a certain income dominates income 
variability under insurance. Manski’s theoretical conclusion is in contrast to the social welfare 
function discussion in Baker et al. (2008), where the implication is that the harmonic mean of 
VSL may be a reasonable alternative cost threshold for regulatory policy if differences in 
willingness to pay are ignored. 
 Although the formulation in (4) is the standard approach in the literature, one could 
hypothesize other forms for the social welfare function. There has long been discussion of the 
merits of using the willingness-to-pay measure as the reference point. Some non-economists 
have suggested that ability to pay should not be a factor, but the critics do not specify how the 
social welfare function should be modified to achieve the purported equity. Can one achieve the 
desired equitable results by endowing people with income they do not have? Will the net value 
of endowments still be within the societal budget constraints? How much should this endowment 
be and how should it be distributed across the population?  
In contrast to the ill-defined critique of conventional social welfare functions, Baker et al. 
(2008) explore an approach that is both well defined and incorporates a concept of equity. Rather 
than constructing the social welfare function to equalize the marginal social value of wealth 
across individuals, they suggest a model in which the social welfare function equalizes the 
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marginal social welfare value of the risk reduction. So, suppose that irrespective of differences 
across the population in a person’s willingness to pay for a given reduced mortality risk πi, that 
the distributional weights in the social welfare function are constructed so that rather than 
/ iv y   being equalized it is / iv    that is equalized across the population. In the alternative 
formulation of the social welfare function, the key benefit parameter is not the arithmetic mean 
VSL across the population but rather the harmonic mean VSL.13 Although the harmonic mean 
framework is unconventional, it shows the fundamental role of VSL in a variety of social welfare 
contexts, and we will use our quantile estimates to explore both the arithmetic mean and 
harmonic mean values. 
The standard hedonic wage models do not yield estimates of either the arithmetic mean 
VSL or the harmonic mean VSL. Rather, they generate the coefficients that minimize the sum of 
squared residuals when fitting a regression to the set of observed wage-fatality risk combinations 
observed in the labor market. For our data, the conventional VSL estimate from a hedonic wage 
equation that will serve as the reference point is $7 million to $8 million (Kniesner et al. 2008). 
Thus the conventional regression VSL estimate is similar to our median quantile estimate of 
$7.55 million.  
By using the results implied by the quantile wage estimates, we are able to explore the 
shape of the distribution of the individual VSLis across the population. For purposes of our 
research we pool the quantile VSL estimates from the focal set of quantile estimates (0.1, 0.25, 
0.50, 0.75, 0.90) and the additional quantile values (0.13, 0.38, 0.63, 0.83, 0.95). For 
concreteness, we will assume that the population distribution of VSLi values is the same as that 
                                                          
13 For policies financed by taxes, there is also an adjustment term involving the covariance of individual i’s tax rate 
and the inverse of VSLi. If that covariance is zero, then the appropriate unit benefit value is simply the harmonic 
mean VSL. When policies are funded by a lump sum tax the benefits measure equals the harmonic mean VSL. More 
generally, the harmonic mean will be a lower bound on the benefits measure. See Baker et al. (2008). 
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for our sample of workers. It is straightforward to match the VSL levels to particular affected 
populations based on wage rate differences using the empirical results above. As Figure 1 
indicates, there is substantial heterogeneity; the VSL rises at an increasing rate as one moves to 
the upper quantiles of the wage distribution. The discussion below will focus on the estimates for 
the preferred model, which is the random effects model for which   = 1.0. 
 To calculate the value of VSL implied by the quantile results, we fit a quadratic function 
to the quantile estimates.14 The arithmetic mean VSL across the entire wage distribution equals 
$10.7 million, which exceeds both the median value as well as the mean from a standard hedonic 
wage regression. The mean VSL here would be increasingly closer to the standard mean hedonic 
VSL if the number of quantiles used for the illustrative calculation were increased. For our 
purposes what is of primary interest is the relative magnitude of the mean VSL and the harmonic 
mean VSL, where the arithmetic and harmonic means are both calculated in a consistent way 
across the distribution of estimates. 
The non-standard social welfare formulation in which there is an equal marginal social 
value placed on risk reductions for all citizens irrespective of their individual willingness to pay 
is not necessarily more protective, and indeed the opposite may be the case. The harmonic mean 
VSL that emerges as the key parameter in the equalized social valuations of risk reduction 
models must always be less than the arithmetic mean for VSL amounts, which are by definition 
never negative and not constant across the population. In the special case in which policies are 
financed by a lump-sum tax that is identical for all individuals and one adopts the risk value 
                                                          
14 Let q indicate the quantile percentile VSL, then VSL = 5.578 (1.215) – 15.453 (7.373) q  + 38.454 (8.181) q2, R2 = 
0.97, where the numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. For the semi-log version of the model, ln (VSL) = 
1.142 (0.063) + 1.525  (0.374) q + 0.737  (0.383) q2, R2 = 0.99. Based on the linear model, the arithmetic mean VSL 
is $10.7 million, and the harmonic mean VSL is $7.2 million, and with the semi-log model the arithmetic mean is 
$10.7 million, and the harmonic mean is $7.0 million. The fitted predicted values for the semi-log specification have 
more attractive properties in that the VSL is always increasing as the quantile percentage rises so those estimates 
will be the focus of the discussion.  
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equalization social welfare function approach, the pertinent VSL for benefit assessment is the 
harmonic mean. For our quantile estimates, the harmonic mean is $7.0 million, which is about 
two-thirds of the size of the arithmetic mean calculated using the same quantile estimates and 
about equal to the median VSL. The implications of the standard social welfare approach in 
which willingness to pay valuations receive the same marginal social value are larger estimated 
benefits and greater levels of risk protection than would be generated by a social welfare 
function that equalizes the social welfare weight placed on different marginal risk reductions. Put 
somewhat differently, the sometimes criticized emphasis on individual willingness to pay will 
lead to more stringent regulations than an approach divorced from willingness to pay coupled 
with an assumption that risk reductions of a given magnitude have the same value across society 
irrespective of one’s financial resources. 
4. Additional Policy Relevant Heterogeneity: New Estimates of Income Elasticity of VSL  
 Quantile estimates of the VSL can be used in conjunction with family income 
information in the PSID to calculate the income elasticity of the VSL,  
,( ) ( ( ) / ( ))( ( ) / ( ))j VSL y j j j jVSL y y VSL        ,      (5) 
which Table 2 presents. 
The VSL levels exhibit particularly sharp increases for the 0.75 and 0.90 quantiles. The 
two high-wage quantiles also are coupled with substantial decreases in the fatality risk level so 
that we observe both a positive income elasticity of VSL as well as a negative elasticity of the 
VSL with respect to average fatality rates. We estimate the elasticity of the estimated VSL at 
different quantiles with respect to the real family income levels at the quantiles.15 Based on a 
linear regression of VSL on the quantile-specific real family income, the overall income 
                                                          
15 Note that our estimates do in fact construct an income elasticity based on real family income levels, whereas what 
the previous literature refers to as an income elasticity is actually an elasticity with respect to worker wage levels. 
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elasticity of VSL across the quantiles is 1.44.16 The elasticity amount varies depending on the 
quantile, with a high value of 2.24 at the low-wage 0.10 quantile to a low elasticity value of 1.23 
at the high-wage 0.90 quantile.17 The estimates are similar for a specification that also includes a 
quadratic real family income term, with an overall elasticity of 1.32 and an elasticity range from 
2.06 at low wage levels to 1.16 at high wage levels. In each case, higher income levels have the 
most pronounced effect on the VSL for the low-wage workers, and the elasticity estimates 
throughout all quantile values are above 1.0. 
The very high income elasticity of VSL at low wage levels may account for why 
countries at less advanced stages of development enact very few health, safety, or environmental 
regulations until per capita income levels in those countries rise to an adequate level. The 
perceived economic benefits of risk regulation will be extremely low if income levels are low 
because the VSL declines at very low income levels at a rate that is more than proportional to the 
decrease in income. 
 Our estimates of a large income elasticity of VSL are consistent with the simple 
theoretical models that have been developed. Kaplow (2005), for example, develops a model of 
VSL in which there is no bequest motive and the person picks the level of precautionary 
expenditures.18 In his model, the coefficient of relative risk aversion provides a lower bound on 
the consumption elasticity of VSL, which is similar to but not identical to the income elasticity. 
With recent estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion being around 2 based on the 
                                                          
16 The linear equation used to estimate income elasticity is VSL = -5499606 (773449) + 259.3 (9.6), R2 = 0.998. 
17 The quantile ranges are based on the quantile values at points estimated in the regressions. One would, for 
example, expect the elasticity value to be even greater at the 0.01 quantile. 
18 Other studies of this relationship along similar lines include Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2001) and Evans and Smith 
(2010). The latter paper shows that with more complex and more realistic models the relationship between the 
income elasticity of VSL and the coefficient of relative risk aversion becomes less clear cut. 
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labor supply analysis of Chetty (2006) and the consumption analysis of Kniesner and Ziliak 
(2002), one would expect the VSL to be income elastic, which is what the results above indicate.  
 Our VSL income elasticity estimates are somewhat higher than those estimated for the 
valuation of job injuries. Estimates of the income elasticity of job injuries based on the estimated 
functional forms of utility functions imply lower elasticities than those indicated by the 
coefficient of relative risk aversion. For two different models estimated in Viscusi and Evans 
(1990), the estimated income elasticity of the value of statistical job injuries was 1.10 and 0.67. 
They also noted that the elasticity values exceed the estimated income elasticity for health 
insurance, which typically are in the range of 0.5 and below.  
 The greatest inconsistency with previous empirical findings is that our estimate of an 
income-elastic VSL is inconsistent with the implications of VSL meta analyses in the literature. 
The meta analyses have estimated the elasticity of VSL with respect to the average worker wage 
rate in the study, which the authors generally refer to as the income elasticity. Using a large 
sample of hedonic wage studies, Viscusi and Aldy (2003) take the models and authors’ methods 
used in a series of previous meta analyses and find an income elasticity of VSL of 0.51-0.61. The 
specifications developed by Viscusi and Aldy (2003) likewise yielded income elasticity 
estimates ranging from 0.5-0.6. The U.S. Dept. of Transportation (2008) has selected the 
midpoint of their range 0.55 as its VSL income elasticity figure for policy analysis. It is 
especially noteworthy that none of the 95% confidence intervals for the VSL income elasticities 
reported in Viscusi and Aldy (2003) include estimates as high as 1.0. 
 The inconsistency between the implications of the meta analyses and our quantile results 
may be another example of the importance of accounting for within sample heterogeneity in 
VSL. Unlike the meta analyses across studies, our research focuses on the within sample 
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elasticity. Our quantile results demonstrate that there is considerable heterogeneity in the VSL as 
evidenced by the substantial curvature in the relationship between the VSL and the worker wage 
rate. In contrast, the meta analyses are based on pooling the single VSL estimates from different 
studies, none of which capture the within sample heterogeneity that we do here. Because of the 
nonlinear relationship between the VSL and income levels, meta analyses of the VSL-wage 
relationship do not capture the strong curvature in the VSL-income relationship and will tend to 
mute the estimated income elasticity. 
5. Conclusion 
We have noted the dependence of VSL on demographic factors such as age, race, sex, 
and health habits in the current literature (Viscusi and Aldy 2003; Aldy and Viscusi 2008). 
Potential wealth and consumption also produces interpersonal differences (Kniesner, Viscusi, 
and Ziliak 2006). Somewhat more controversial is heterogeneity in VSL according to how one 
dies (Viscusi 2009). The heterogeneity issue is policy relevant as targeted (more efficient) 
regulatory cutoffs are the objective. 
We find substantial heterogeneity in the marginal effects of fatal injury risk on wages 
using panel data and a quantile regression model that admits latent intercept heterogeneity. Inter-
quantile differences in wages further magnify the differences in VSL so that it varies by a factor 
of 4.0 in our preferred regression specification. Although the extreme differences affect the 
arithmetic mean VSL, it does not affect the median, which is also close to the harmonic mean 
VSL. We noted reasons why a potential cut-off for regulatory policy might be the median, which 
guarantees a majority benefit, or the harmonic mean, which may maximize social welfare. Both 
the median and the harmonic mean we find are $7 million to $8 million so that the regulatory 
cutoff is robust to the harmonic mean and median regulatory cost cutoff justifications. 
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Finally, we examine the income elasticity of VSL, and find that it is income elastic in our 
data. The income-elastic VSL we find is important for two reasons, one related to removing a 
seeming inconsistency in two strands of empirical research and the other related to updating 
regulatory policy decisions for societal income growth or targeting cutoffs according to the 
affected population. An income-elastic VSL is required for it to be consistent with the estimated 
risk aversion parameters in the literature. Our results are the first we know of to be consistent 
with the risk preferences estimates elsewhere. Moreover, even if one does not find it politically 
feasible to use regulatory cost cutoffs that vary with the incomes of the target population, at a 
minimum our results support increasing a common cutoff over time proportionately with 
society’s income growth.  
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Table 1. Quantile Estimates of Labor-Market Fatality Risk Coefficient with and without Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
Quantile No Unobserved 
Heterogeneity 
Unobserved Heterogeneity 
(λ = Tuning Parameter) 



















































Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses, calculated from 500 bootstrap replications. The panel quantile bootstrap standard errors jointly sample the residual and 
regressors. All models control for a quadratic in age, indicators for education, race, union status, marital status, and region of country, as well as year and state 





Table 2. Panel Quantile Estimates of the Income Elasticity of VSL 









0.10 8.66 7.83 33,583 3,464,000 
 
2.24 
0.25 11.71 8.20 43,478 4,918,200 
 
2.04 
0.50 17.16 7.68 57,768 7,550,400 
 
1.76 
0.75 25.09 6.07 75,762 14,552,200 
 
1.20 
0.90 36.74 3.69 117,792 22,044,000 1.23 
Note: From the panel quantile model in Table 1 with tuning parameter  λ = 1.0. All dollar amounts are denoted in real 2001 terms based on the personal 
consumption expenditure deflator. The elasticity is calculated by regressing the VSL at each quantile on average family income at each quantile, and multiplying 
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Figure 1: Quantile Estimates of VSL with and without Unobserved  
Heterogeneity 
No Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Unobserved Heterogeneity: lambda = 2.0 
Unobserved Heterogeneity: lambda = 1.0 
Unobserved Heterogeneity: lambda = 0.5 














0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Millions 
Quantile 
Figure 2.  Quantile Estimates of the VSL Evaluated at the Median Wage  
and Quantile - Specific Fatality Parameter 
No Unobserved Heterogeneity 
Unobserved Heterogeneity: lambda = 2.0 
Unobserved Heterogeneity: lambda = 1.0 
Unobserved Heterogeneity: lambda = 0.5 
Unobserved Heterogeneity: lambda = 0.01 
